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were valid on their face, i.e., to facilitate communications, this goal
could just as easily have been accomplished away from the bargaining
table.
Conclusion
The need for a bargaining atmosphere conducive to stable bargaining relationships is 'the basic policy underlying the LMRA. This policy
is effectuated in part by allowing the Board to determine appropriate
bargaining units and to certify official bargaining agents. Thus, where
one party attempts via direct coalition bargaining to alter the bargaining unit, Board policy will operate to prevent such unilateral change
because of the disruptive effect upon bargaining stability. Moreover,
where the presence of outside union representatives on the bargaining
committee of a single union creates such confusion, uncertainty and
disruption upon the negotiations that effective bargaining is rendered
difficult, the Board should for the same policy reasons not require the
employer to bargain. Unfortunately, the Board failed to see this
similarity in General Electric and thus allowed the union to accomplish indirectly what it could not otherwise accomplish directly.
WAYNE L. BELL

SAVING STATUTE'S EFFECT ON LIMITATIONS OF
ACTIONS WITH LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
To prevent inequities in the application of statutes of limitations,
American jurisdictions have enacted saving statutes to toll or suspend
the running of the period of limitation while the defendant is absent
from the state. 1 Recently, however, legislatures in all states have
'E.g., The Texas saving statute provides:
If any person against whom there shall be cause of action shall be
without the limits of this State at the time of the accruing of such action,
or at any time during which the same might have been maintained, the
person entitled to such action shall be at liberty to bring the same against
such person after his return to the State and the time of such person's
absence shall not be accounted or taken as a part of the time limited by
any provision of this title.
TEx. RiEv. Cv. STAT, ANN. art. 5537 (1958).
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enacted nonresident motorist statutes2 which permit the state courts to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in cases
arising from motor vehicle accidents occurring within the particular
state.3 The question which has been presented in about one-half of
the states is whether the saving statute should continue to toll the
-ALA. CODE tit. 7, § i99 (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.020 (1962); ARIZ.
28-502 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-342.1 (Supp. 1967); CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 17451 (West Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-2 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-62 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3112 (Supp.
1966); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-423 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.171 (1969); GA. CODE
ANN. § 68-8oi (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWs § 230.33 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 49-1602 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 9-301 (Smith-Hurd 1958); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 47-1043 (Rep]. Vol. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.498 (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-401 (1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.020 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3474 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1911 (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66/2, § 115 (Repl. Vol. 1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. go, §§ 3 A, 3B (1967);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170-55 (1960); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 9352-61 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.210 (Supp. 1968); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 53-203 (Repl. Vol. 1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-530 (Repl. Vol. 1964); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 14.070 (Repl. Pages 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:1 (Repl.
Vol. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-3 (Repl. Vol.
196o); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 253 (McKinney 196o); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105
(Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-11 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.20
(Baldwin Repl. Part 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 391 (1962); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 15.190 (Repl. Part 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 2o001 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 31-7-6 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-104 (Supp. 1968); S.D. CODE §
33.O809 (Supp. 196o); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20.224 (Supp. 1968); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2039 a (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-8 (Repl. Vol. 196o); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 891 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.040 (Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-31 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
345.09 (Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-52 (Supp. 1967).
OE.g., The Texas nonresident motorist statute provdes:
Section I.The acceptance by a nonresident of this State or by a person
who was a resident of this State at the time of the accrual of a cause
of action but who subsequently removes therefrom .... of the rights, privileges and benefits extended by law to such persons of operating a motor
vehicle... within the State of Texas shall be deemed equivalent to an
appointment by such nonresident ... of the Chairman of the State Highway Commission of this State... to be his true and lawful attorney and
agent upon whom may be served all lawful process in any civil action ...
growing out of any accident, or collision in which said nonresident...
may be involved while operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle within this
State ... and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of the
agreement of said nonresident ... that any such process against him...
served upon said Chairman ... shall be of the same legal force and validity
as if served personally.
Service of such process shall be made by leaving a certified copy of the
process issued in the hands of the Chairman ... and such service shall be
sufficient upon said nonresident .... provided, however, that notice of such
service and a copy of the process be forthwith sent by registered mail by
the Chairman ... to the nonresident defendant ....
TLx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2o39a (1964).
REV. STAT. ANN. §
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period of limitation when there is a method for acquiring personal
4
jurisdiction under the state's nonresident motorist statute.
This precise question was recently presented to the Supreme Court
of Texas in Vaughn v. Deitz.5 On January 11, 1964, the parties in
Vaughn were involved in an automobile collision on a Texas highway. At the time of the accident all of the parties were residents of
that state. In June of 1964 the defendants, Virgil A. Vaughn and his
wife, left Texas and established residence in Florida. With the exception of several brief visits, they did not return to Texas. On January
18, 1966, plaintiffs instituted an action to recover damages for personal injuries received in the collision. As provided in the Texas nonresident motorist statute,6 service was had on the Chairman of the
State Highway Commission as the defendants' designated agent to
receive process. The defendants were given proper notice of the action
by registered mail.
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the
ground -thatthe action was barred by the two-year limitation on initiating actions for personal injuries. 7 The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the suit for
trial.8 On appeal the Texas supreme court, in a four-to-three decision,
affirmed the holding of the appellate court. The court held that the
clear wording of the saving statute tolled the running of the two-year
limitation period so long as the defendants were not physically present
in Texas. 9
The dissenting judges argued that "the presence or absence of a
defendant [for the purposes of the saving statute] must be solved in
terms of jurisdiction over the person."' 0 Since a defendant is subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the Texas court under the non-resident
4See cases cited notes 13 g:14 infra.
r43o S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968).
6TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2039 a (1964).
7The Texas statute of limitations provides:
There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after
the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions or
suits in court of the following description:
6. Action for injury done to th& person of another.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
8
Deitz v. Vaughn, 423 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'The court further held that there had been no violation of defendants' constitutional privilege of equal protection of the laws since notice was more complicated when the defendant was a nonresident. "Absence from the state is not an
unreasonable or arbitrary basis of classification where the statutes of limitation are
concerned...." 430 S.W.2d
at 490.
20430 S.V.2d at 491 ,

1969]

CASE COMMENTS

motorist statute, it followed that the period of limitation should continue to run notwithstanding the defendants' continued physical absence from Texas.
A typical nonresident motorist statute, such as that involved in
Vaughn, provides for service upon a state official as the defendant's
agent to receive process for any claim arising out of an automobile
accident occurring within the state." By virtue of such statutes, a
plaintiff is no longer precluded from gaining personal service on the
nonresident defendant by reason of the defendant's absence. While the
nonresident motorist statutes are not in direct conflict with either the
statutes of limitations or saving statutes, 12 courts deciding cases in
which all three statutes have been involved have had difficulty in
interpreting the earlier legislation in the light of the more recent
nonresident motorist statutes. A majority of the courts faced with the
problem have held that the period of limitation continues to run while
the defendant is out of the state if the plaintiff can get a personal
judgment against him.' 3 A minority of the courts, as in Vaughn, have
continued to apply the saving statute and have thus suspended the
statute of limitations during the defendant's absence, permitting the
limitation period to run only while the defendant is physically within
4
the state.'
In states where it has been held that the statute of limitations is
not tolled but continues to run in situations similar to Vaughn, the
uTEx. Rrv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 2o39a (1964).
'Compare Trax. REY. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5537 (1968) with TEx. RaV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 20o39a (1964) and TFx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
2fBurkhardt v. Bates, 296 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1961), aff'g 191 F. Supp. 149 (N.D.
Iowa) ; Bond v. Golden, 273 F.2d 265 (ioth Cir. 1959) (applying Kansas law); Puchek
v. Elledge, 16o F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ind. 1958); Smith v. Pasqualetto, 146 F. Supp.
68o (D. Mass. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1957); Peters v.
Tuell Dairy Co., 25o Ala. 6o, 35 So. 2d 344 (1948); Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn.
643, 166 A. 70 (1933); Hurwitch v. Adams, 52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591 (1959); Nelson
v. Richardson, 295 Ill. App. 504, 15 N.E. 2d 17 (1938); Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa
571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952); Hammel v. Bettison, 362 Mich. 396, lO7 N.W.2d 887
(1961); Haver v. Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Cal-Farms Ins. Co. v.
Oliver, 78 Nev. 479, 375 P.2d 857 (1962); Bolduc v. Richards, ioi N.H. 3o3, 142 A.2d
156 (1958); Benally v. Pigman, 78 N.M. 189, 429 P.2d 648 (1967); Fuller v. Stuart, 3
Misc. 2d 456, 153 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Jarchow v. Eder, 433 P.2d 942
(Okla. 1967); Whittington v. Davis, 221 Ore. 209, 350 P.2d 913 (g6o); Will v.
Malosky, 432 Pa. 246, 247 A.2d 788 (1968); Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 66 N.W.2d
91o (1954); Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938);
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964); Bergman v. Turpin, 206 Va.
539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965); Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 912, 395
P.2d -0o (1964); cf. Dibble v. Jensen, 129 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1
'Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. S.C. 1953); Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho
616, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957); Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523 (1963); Couts
v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 9o N.E.2d 139 (1950); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252
N.W. 284 (1934).
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courts have avoided the operation of the saving statute by: (i) employing the fiction of constructive presence,' 5 (2) declaring the saving
statute inapplicable when the defendant is amenable to service in the
state by his agent,' 6 and (3) finding the statute inoperative so long as
the courts of that state have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 17
By applying the fiction of constructive presence, some courts have
determined that the effect of the term "absence" in the saving statute
can be avoided. The rationale is that the statute will not be applicable
since the defendant is constructively present in the state through his
appointed agent. This fiction was utilized in Hurwitch v. Adams, 8
where is was stated:
The fictional presence of a defendant by an agent imposed by
law upon the defendant, brings the defendant within the State
for purposes of service of process and the same fiction causes
the period of limitations to run. 9
In place of the constructive presence approach, some courts have
relied upon the argument that absence, as contemplated by the saving statute, is merely that which prevents the plaintiff from obtaining
service on the defendant within the state.20 One of the functions of
the nonresident motorist statute is to provide the plaintiff with a
means of acquiring in-state service on the defendant.21 Constructive
service on the defendant's agent has the same effect as if the defendant
had been personally served within the state. 22 In Kokenge v. Holthaus23
the Iowa supreme court did not attempt to rely on the fiction of constructive presence, but found that the saving statute was inapplicable
when service was attainable in the state under the nonresident motorist
statute.
'Hurwitch v. Adams, 52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591 (1959); cf. Arrowood v. McMinn
County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938); Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., 64
Wash. 2d 912,
"Kokenge
ards, 1o N.H.
(1954); Snyder

395 P.2d 2O (1964).
v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952); Bolduc v. Rich3o3, 142 A.2d 156 (1958); Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 66 N.W.2d 91o
v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
7
See Hammel v. Bettison, 362 Mich. 396, 1o7 N.W.2d 887 (1961); Whittington
v. Davis, 221 Ore. 209, 350 P.2d 913 (196o); Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173

Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938); cf. Jarchow v. Eder, 433 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1967).
B52 Del. 13, 151 A.2d 286 (Super. Ct.), afi'd, 52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591 (1959).
"151 A.2d at 28.

mSee cases cited note 16 supra.
"E.g., TFx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 20392 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1

(Supp. 1968).
2E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95V, § 9-301
STAT. ANN. art. 2o39a (1964).
3243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711 (1952)-

(Smith-Hurd 1958); Tax. REv. CIV.
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The third alternative was utilized by the court in Whittington v.
24
to avoid the application of the saving statute. Basing its deDavis

cision on the concept of the court's jurisdictional power over the nonresident, it was held that the court's jurisdiction was not affected by
the defendant's absence or residence out of the state. As stated by the
court:
The availability of the right to compel the attendance of the
defendant or to obtain and enforce a valid judgment against
him is all that a plaintiff is entitled to. When such a right is
present
there is no cause to apply the tolling [saving] statute
25
at all.

Although the plaintiff in Whittington did not make use of the service
procedure provided in the nonresident motorist statute, this procedure had been available to him at all times, and the court had
been fully competent to render a personal judgment against the defendant. As the powers of the court were not suspended by the defendant's absence, it was determined that the statute of limitations
26
should continue to run.

In Vaughn and in the other cases where it has been held that the
statute of limitations is tolled while the defendant is physically absent
Ore. 209, 350 P.2d 913 (i96o).
-35 P.2d at 915.
"See cases cited note 17 supra.
Underlying these legal arguments are the detrimental effects the courts found
would occur when the limitation statute was tolled. Suits could be postponed indefinitely although they may be maintained at any time. Bolduc v. Richards, ioi
N.H. 3o3, 142 A.-2d 156 (1958); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249,
i N.Y.S.2d 749 (1938) (dissenting opinion); Whittington v. Davis, 221 Ore. 209, 350
P.2d 913 (196o); Bergman v. Turpin, 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965); see
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964). The plaintiff would have the
power to delay the suit until the defendant could no longer contact and produce
his witnesses. Jarchow v. Eder, 433 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1967); Whittington v. Davis,
221 Ore. 209, 350 P.2d 913 (196o); Bergman v. Turpin, 20o6 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135
(1965). Even if the witnesses were still available, it may be that the years have
dimmed their memories, and their testimony is no longer useful as evidence for
the defense. Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 25o Ala. 6oo, 35 So. 2d 344 (1948); Bolduc
v. Richards, ioi N.H. 3o3, 142 A.2d 156 (1958). Apparently these arguments lead
to the conclusion that the saving statute will not be permitted to reintroduce those
evils which the statute of limitation was enacted to correct. 3 J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONsTRUcTION § 7103 ( 3 d ed. 1943).
The minority view may even encourage the plaintiff to delay bringing his
suit until after the statute of limitations would normally run against personal
injury actions. If there is a chance that the defendant has a counterclaim, the
plaintiff could wait until the statute had run as to defendant's claim in order
to prevent the defendant from interposing his counterclaim into the plaintiff's
action. The plaintiff would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by such
a delay.
2'221
o
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from the state, the usual basis for this result has been that the clear
wording of the statute precludes a different interpretation. There is
no wording in the nonresident motorist statute to indicate that it is
to take precedence over the saving statute.27 Since the two statutes are
not in direct conflict, courts following the minority view have simply
given full effect to both.28 It has been further stated that any inequities
resulting from a literal interpretation of these statutes should be
29
remedied by the legislature.
Thus, courts in those jurisdictions which have not been presented
with the problem in Vaughn will have the benefit of several arguments
to determine whether they will follow the majority or minority views.
It is likely that this determination will ultimately have to be made
unless there is an attempt to resolve this particular conflict by the
30
legislatures of those states.
It should be noted further that a problem related to the one presented in Vaughn may arise in a broader range of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the
traditional limits of a state's jurisdiction over persons outside the
borders of the forum state. 31 In light of these decisions, several states
enacted general "long-arm" statutes32 to affirmatively acknowledge
the intent of the state to take advantage of this power (at least with
respect to causes of action arising from specified conduct within the
state) and to provide procedures to bring the out-of-state defendant
into court. However, even in those states which as yet have no long-arm
legislation, it seems that the courts would still have jurisdiction in the
constitutional sense over an out-of-state defendant.33 Hence, if those
states presently have a statutory procedure which is within the limits
of due process to serve and to give proper notice to the out-of-state
defendant, then the courts may assert this expanded jurisdiction over
him. 34 Thus, the problem involving the saving statute's continued
27Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d o21 (1957); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio
St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950).
2nCases cited note 14 supra.
2Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 2o N.J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 43o (Sup. Ct. 1942).
wE.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 892
(Supp. 1968).
mCompare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) with McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
1E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. nto, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); see generally 22 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 152 (1965).
S3ee St. Clair v. Righter, 25o F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966).
MMcGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (service by registered
mail under statute providing for such method on out-of-state insurance companies);
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applicability may soon be tested in three possible legal settings: (1) in
states with long-arm statutes providing for substituted in-state service
on an agent appointed in the statute,35 (2) in states with long-arm
statutes but where process generally must be presented to the defendant in person, 36 or (3) in states where there is no long-arm statute,
or where the court has decided to go beyond the terms of an existing
37
long-arm statute.
In those states which have long-arm statutes providing for substituted service on a state official as defendant's agent, courts following the
majority view would have little difficulty applying the same reasoning
utilized to avoid the operation of the saving statute under the nonresident motorist statute since the service provisions of the two statutes
are similar.3 8 So long as the defendant has an agent in the state -to
receive process, he may be deemed constructively present for purposes
of the application of the saving statute. In addition, since service may
be had in the state on the designated official, the argument that the
saving statute applies only when the plaintiff is not able to obtain
in-state service would similarly make the saving statute inapplicable.
Furthermore, since jurisdiction over the defendant is available at all
times, the jurisdictional argument could easily be met.39
The result would be less certain, however, in the other two judicial
settings. In those jurisdictions where the plaintiff must seek the defendant out of the state for service of process, the court would not
be justified in saying that the defendant is amenable to service inside
the state, nor could it be argued that the defendant is constructively
present since there is no agent appointed for him within the state.
Thus it would seem that the court could avoid the application of the
saving statute only on the basis of jurisdiction.
In those states which have no long-arm statute, it is doubtful that
a court could even assert jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant.
Although there may be jurisdiction in the sense that it would not
violate due process if the defendant were before the court, that
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (service on salesman in the
state); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (personal service out of state on
domiciliary as provided by statute).
-E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).

E.g., N.Y. CiV. PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
3See St. Clair v. Righter, 25o F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966).
!Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968) with TEX. REv. Clv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (1964).
*Burris v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 543, 273 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct.
1966) (applying Tennessee law).

